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INTRODUCTION
Andrea Guerrero's Silence at Boalt Hall: The Dismantling of
Affirmative Action ("Silence at Boalt Hall") is the story of the rise and fall
of affirmative action at Boalt Hall, the law school of the University of
California at Berkeley ("Boalt Hall" or "Boalt"). According to Guerrero,
her book is neither a "general history of affirmative action" nor a "rigorous
study of admissions criteria" (p. xiii). Guerrero's purpose in examining
affirmative action at Boalt Hall is to "ground" the theoretical aspects of the
affirmative action debate in the context of a real institution (p. xiii). The
story Guerrero tells is nuanced and rich in detail, successfully giving the
reader the sense of being there. Further, Guerrero's policy analysis, though
not as developed as one might like, is illuminating. With the Supreme
Court poised to decide the future of affirmative action in two cases this
term,' Guerrero's book anticipated a discussion that is now at the forefront
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1. The cases before the Court are Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (Dec. 2, 2002), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 277 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2001), cert.
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of the national policy debate. The experiences of schools in post-
affirmative action states, such as Texas, Florida, and California, will likely
play a key role in shaping the Court's determination. Guerrero's book is
one of a handful of sources we have about those experiences.
However, Silence at Boalt Hall suffers from a drawback common in
the affirmative action literature. While the book is fundamentally about the
dismantling of racial diversity, it does not define what it means by the term
"diversity."2 Nor does the book provide a clear sense of the precise func-
tions of diversity. Without an understanding of what is meant by
"diversity" and an appreciation, of its social benefits, assessing the cost of
dismantling diversity is difficult. More immediately, understanding the
meaning and functions of diversity is crucial to the affirmative action cases
before the Court this term. Current affirmative action policies of universi-
ties in the United States almost all derive from Justice Powell's opinion in
University of California v. Bakke, in which he said that race may serve as
one factor in university admissions practices aimed at the "attainment of a
diverse student body."3 The pursuit of racial diversity, in other words,
could be a compelling state interest.4 Justice Powell, however, left incom-
plete what he meant by diversity and why he believed diversity was so im-
portant.5 We do not think that the reason the diversity rationale is
underdeveloped in Powell's opinion is because the concept is sufficiently
clear as to not warrant full explication. We do not believe, in other words,
that we as a society simply know diversity when we see it.6
Nor do the benefits of diversity go without saying.7 They must be
theorized and demonstrated. This project is all the more important given
that, if the Supreme Court is to uphold affirmative action this term, pre-
sumably it will do so because of the value of racial diversity in the educa-
tional process. And to do that (or not), the Court will have to figure out not
only what racial diversity is but also what it does. With Silence at Boalt
Hall as a backdrop, this Review Essay attempts to answer these questions.
After commenting on the contributions Guerrero's book makes to the
affirmative action debate, we supplement it with a taxonomy for diversity.
2. In this Review Essay, we use the term "diversity" as a shorthand interchangeable with the
more specific term "racial diversity." We of course recognize that the term "diversity" applies much
more broadly.
3. 438 U.S. 265,311 (1978).
4. A governmental use of a racial classification "must serve a compelling governmental interest,
and must be narrowly tailored to further the interest." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 235 (1995).
5. What Justice Powell did suggest was that First Amendment interests supported race-
conscious practices to create racially diverse student communities so as to promote "atmosphere[s] of
'speculation, experiment and creation."' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
6. Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating famously
about hard-core pornography that "I know it when I see it").
7. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)
(holding that diversity is not a compelling justification for affirmative action).
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We posit seven different ways of conceptualizing the utility of diver-
sity: diversity in the context of (1) inclusion; (2) social meaning; (3) citi-
zenship; (4) belonging; (5) colorblindness; (6) speech; and (7) institutional
culture. Each conception relates to the other, and some share the same un-
derlying assumptions, but we discuss them separately for reasons of clarity.
We hope this framework will cause the concept of diversity to have more
political and doctrinal traction in the current debate.
Before proceeding, we should disclose that our particular perspective
is informed by our time as faculty members at Boalt's sister institution,
UCLA Law School. The two of us were hired at UCLA in 1997, the year
immediately following the passage of Proposition 209. We experienced
firsthand the effects of UCLA moving from one of the most racially di-
verse student bodies in the country to one with almost no Black students,
few Latinas/os, and few Asian Americans who were not of Chinese,
Japanese, or Korean ancestry.8
II
SILENCE AT BOALT HALL
A. Summary
Silence at Boalt Hall begins with the Civil Rights Movement of the
1960s. Guerrero recounts the gradual awakening of Boalt students, admin-
istrators, and faculty to the realization that the law school's student body
was not adequately representative of the ever-diversifying population of
California (pp. 1-5). She then describes the initial outreach efforts, or
"soft" affirmative action, developed to counter the negative impact the tra-
ditional law school admissions process (LSAT- and GPA-based) had on
students of color (pp. 5-7). When these efforts failed to achieve meaningful
integration, Boalt Hall instituted "hard" affirmative action by creating a
Special Admissions program in 1968 (pp. 10-11). From there, Guerrero
moves on to describe the rapid diversification of Boalt's student body in
the 1970s, the controversy this diversification engendered (the rest of
Chapter 1), and conservatives' gradual resistance to and growing resent-
ment of affirmative action in the 1980s (Chapter 2).
Guerrero then details the official dismantling of affirmative action by
the Regents of the University of California ("U.C. Regents") 9 and the vot-
ers of California"° (Chapter 3). She also discusses the subsequent struggles
8. See generally Cheryl 1. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REv.
1215, 1224-25 (2002) (discussing the impact of loss of diversity at UCLA).
9. In 1996, the U.C. Regents adopted SP-1, which ended the "use of race, religion, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin as criteria for admission" in U.C. professional schools and graduate
programs. Regents of the University of California, Resolution Special Policy 1 (July 20, 1995).
10. In 1997, California voters adopted the ballot measure Proposition 209, which banned state
discrimination or preferential treatment "on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in
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of Boalt students to ameliorate the effects of these significant changes
(Chapter 4). Guerrero herself was a student (and protestor) at Boalt during
this period. Likely because of her own experiences and participation,
Guerrero richly brings to life the frustration many students felt not only
about affirmative action's dismantlement but also about the nonrespon-
siveness of the Boalt administration and faculty. Silence at Boalt Hall con-
cludes with a wide-ranging discussion of how Boalt Hall specifically, and
higher education more generally, has coped with some of the more recent
attacks on affirmative action in places like Georgia, Texas, Florida, and
Washington State (Chapter 5). In the last section of this chapter, Guerrero
draws on the narratives of Boalt students, both White and non-White, to
highlight their discomfort about the ways in which the lack of diversity at
Boalt Hall has become both normative and normalized.
B. Comments and Criticisms
Guerrero's thirty-plus year history of affirmative action at Boalt is the
most compelling aspect of Silence at Boalt Hall. Less successful, but still
compelling, is her presentation both of the arguments for and against af-
firmative action in higher education and of the subtle ways in which race,
racism, diversity, and politics impact the debate. While Guerrero describes
her book as a story "nestled between" arguments of policy (p. xiii), the op-
posite is more accurate: nestled in the story are various policy debates re-
garding the benefits and drawbacks of race-consciousness in admissions
and faculty hiring. The strength of this structural approach is that several
key aspects of the affirmative action debate take on new meaning and sig-
nificance when seen in the context of Boalt's affirmative action history.
The drawback of this structure is an often disjointed presentation of impor-
tant policy aspects of the debate and a failure to connect that debate to
Boalt's post-affirmative action status.
Consider, for example, the question of whether affirmative action is
still needed. Critics of affirmative action, at the most basic level, argue that
even if affirmative action were once needed, it no longer is. The playing
field is now level; or, as Ward Connerly puts it, it is time to take off the
"'training wheels' (p. 71). In response, affirmative action proponents
point to the precipitous drop in minority enrollment following affirmative
action's dismantling to claim that the playing field is still tilted. They argue
that, to the extent progress has occurred, that progress stems primarily from
race-conscious programs. While Guerrero usefully situates these arguments
vis-A-vis "resegregation"" at schools such as Boalt and UCLA Law, she
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." Proposition 209, codified
at CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
11. The reference here is to the protests that UCLA students have mounted over the past few
years against what they have called the "resegregation" of the law school.
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does not explicitly articulate the relevance of these arguments for post-
affirmative action institutions.
Another concern is that Guerrero is not always as careful as she might
be with respect to racial categorization. For example, she sometimes treats
Asian Americans as a homogenous population, failing to distinguish ade-
quately between different Asian ethnicities. While Guerrero does occasion-
ally recognize that affirmative action affected Filipina/o students
differently than Japanese students, her analysis sometimes fails to consider
the significance of this difference, resulting in flawed conclusions. For in-
stance, Guerrero argues that because the percentage of Asian American
students enrolled at Boalt, UCLA Law, and U.C. Davis School of Law
changed only negligibly after the repeal of affirmative action, the only true
beneficiaries of Resolution SP-1 and Proposition 209 are White students
(p. 171). However, since Filipina/o and Southeast Asian (such as Laotian
and Cambodian) student enrollment dropped precipitously as a result of
anti-affirmative action measures, the only way overall Asian American
enrollment could remain the same is if other subcategories (such as
Japanese, Chinese, and Korean) rose significantly with the repeal of af-
firmative action.
Finally, Silence at Boalt Hall does not advance our understanding of
racial diversity. Like most participants in the affirmative action debate,
Guerrero deploys the concept without articulating its meaning and func-
tions. As Guerrero's book demonstrates, for the most part diversity factors
into discussions about affirmative action in roughly the following man-
ner: To opponents of affirmative action, diversity means quotas and
"underqualified" people of color; to supporters, diversity means a richer
learning environment and social progress. At best, these arguments are un-
derdeveloped, which is surprising given the political and doctrinal currency
of diversity in public and academic discussions on affirmative action.
Our project in the next section is to broaden the terms upon which
diversity is discussed. We do so by identifying several important functions
of diversity. Our discussion is admittedly a rough first cut at a complex
question. Still, we hope that the taxonomy and conceptualization below
will persuade people to take the diversity rationale for affirmative action
more seriously.
III
CONCEPTIONS OF RACIAL DIVERSITY
This Part seeks to answer the title question of this Review
Essay: What exactly is racial diversity? We define racial diversity both
conceptually and functionally. Conceptually, racial diversity conveys the
idea that a relationship exists between race and social experiences, on the
one hand, and knowledge and practices, on the other. Central to racial
2003] 1153
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diversity, then, is the notion that how we experience, think about, and con-
duct ourselves in society is shaped, though not determined, by our race.
But this definition does not yet answer the question of why racial diversity
is important. In other words, it fails to provide an indication of how racial
diversity functions. This Part lays out seven functions of diversity:
(1) inclusion; (2) social meaning; (3) citizenship; (4) belonging; (5) color-
blindness; (6) speech; and (7) institutional culture. Each function derives
from the relationship between race and social experiences.
Four caveats are in order. First, the functions we describe do not ex-
haust the impact racial diversity has in education and in society more
broadly. Second, while the functions of diversity we identify are overlap-
ping and interconnected, for heuristic purposes we articulate them sepa-
rately. Third, though, for the most part, we explicate each conception with
a law school context in mind (because that is the context with which we are
most familiar), these conceptions have broader resonance. Finally, we do
not fully explicate any of the conceptions we provide. We offer them as
starting points.
A. Inclusion
Racial diversity has the potential to facilitate inclusion. Undergirding
this function is the normative idea that the racial demographics of colleges
and universities should approximate the racial demographics of society as a
whole. Put another way, academic institutions should look at least some-
what like America.12 The diversity problem arises when this is not the case.
For example, if School X is situated in a region with a Black population of
12%, that school is insufficiently diverse if Blacks make up significantly
less than 12% of that school's student body. The strong version of this idea
would require schools to structure their admissions around quotas. Weak
versions require only that schools pay attention to societal racial demo-
graphics and use them as a benchmark against which to evaluate their own
diversity.
Driving the inclusion function is a concern not just about demograph-
ics or representation, but about the very nature of American society. Uni-
versities and colleges define American democracy and serve as gateways to
its benefits. To the extent that certain groups are excluded from universities
and colleges, a democratic process failure has occurred. The mandate of
diversity requires that all groups have access to a constitutive aspect of
American democracy: a college education. No group should be left be-
hind.
12. Cf Clintons Cabinet to 'Look Like America', TORONTO STAR, Nov. 13, 1992, at A5
(describing President Clinton's similar goal in the political context).
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B. Social Meaning
A second function of diversity is to disrupt negative social mean-
ings-stereotypes-about race. To continue the earlier example, if Blacks
are 12% of the population but only 4% of a college's entering class, people
are likely to attribute social meaning to this differential. Some may con-
clude either that Blacks are intellectually inferior to Whites or do not work
as hard. Of course, the argument is often made that affirmative action pro-
grams convey that very idea-that Blacks need affirmative action because
they are intellectually inferior to Whites. However, Black/White student
intellectual interactions can change White students' perceptions of Black
intellectual capacity. Conversely, the absence of Black students does little
to disrupt, and likely entrenches, extant stereotypes about Black intellectual
inferiority.
C. Racially Cooperative Citizenship
A third function of diversity is to facilitate the formation of a racially
cooperative society. Central to this function is the idea that universities are
sites for Americanization. They naturalize us. In other words, who we be-
come as Americans is a function of who we are as students. 3 The nexus
between school socialization and citizenship has profound implications for
race. In short, school segregation produces and legitimizes societal segre-
gation. At the most basic level, students perform in society the racial inter-
actions they learn and rehearse in school.
The mandate of diversity helps create diverse campuses, and diverse
campuses help socialize students to respect and embrace differences. Part
of what makes this socialization possible is that universities encourage col-
legiality. The institutionalization of this norm structures how students in-
teract with each other.4 Though student interactions are not always
collegial, the existence of the collegiality norm increases the likelihood that
students will bridge racial divides and develop interracial trust and under-
standing. To remove diversity (or reduce it significantly) from the educa-
tional setting is to eliminate one of the primary institutional contexts for
interracial communication and community building. Without racial diver-
sity, students learn to normalize racial exclusivity, a normalization that
13. Justice Powell recognized as much in Bakke, noting that "it is not too much to say that the
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of
students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples." 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
14. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 1, 24 (2000) ("The research has yielded a broad consensus that intergroup contact 'will reduce
prejudice... when (a) there is equality of status among the individuals in contact, (b) they meet in a
situation of cooperative interdependence, and (c)... there is normative support for friendly intergroup
relations."'); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 2003).
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helps determine the kind of racial citizens they become and the kind of ra-
cial citizenship they tolerate.
D. Belonging
A fourth function of diversity is to promote belonging. To the extent
that any racial group is underrepresented within a university, the students
from that group may be perceived as outsiders: students who are not sup-
posed to be there; students who do not belong. 5 With greater diversity, the
institutional message that each underrepresented student belongs is
strengthened.
One might argue, however, that affirmative action and other diversity
programs actually undermine students of color belonging. The notion
might be that if, for example, a university does not have an affirmative ac-
tion policy and admits a small number of Latinas/os, White students will
perceive that these students really belong-that they are special. Deserv-
ing. They got in based on merit, not race. They are exceptions to the rule
that Latinas/os cannot compete without affirmative action. We refer to this
perception as "racial exceptionalism."' 6
Assuming that the lack of diversity programs produces racial excep-
tionalism, it does not necessarily follow that racial exceptionalism pro-
duces belonging. As the experiences of UCLA law student Anthony
Solana, Jr. attest, racial exceptionalism can engender racial conflict and
alienation. According to Solana:
During my first year of law school I had the great fortune of doing
well. However, I felt isolated because white students made so much
about my ability to compete with them on equal footing.. . I think
people expected me not to do all that well .... [A]fter I secured a
job at a large law firm in Los Angeles, something that the majority
of white students in my section could not do... I incurred their
wrath. 17
Implicit in Solana's narrative is the notion that, from his classmates' per-
spective, he was not supposed to do well, even though he was admitted to
UCLA without affirmative action. More particularly, Solana was not sup-
posed to do better than his White counterparts. Presumably, one reason
Solana's classmates noticed his academic performance is that he was under
15. Cf KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989) (employing the theme of belonging to analyze various aspects of American
citizenship).
16. We are not the first to use this term. See, e.g., Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race
Coalitions: Critical Movements that Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377, 1423 n.94
(2000).
17. Brief of Amici Curiae UCLA School of Law Students of Color in Support of Respondent at
25-26, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en bane), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (Dec.
2, 2002) (No. 02-241), available at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/gruamicus-usse/
um/BLSG-gru.pdf (last visited May 3, 2003).
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surveillance. His classmates were watching him. Does he really belong? Is
he really an exception? Can he really cut it? Racially invested students may
want answers to the foregoing questions. But when the answer (as provided
by grades) is not what they expect, their own sense of intellectual worth is
compromised and racial antagonism of the sort Solana describes results. In
sum, even if the absence of diversity programs produces racial exceptional-
ism, this exceptionalism will not necessarily promote belonging. By con-
trast, racial diversity likely does.
E. Colorblindness
A fifth function of diversity is to promote colorblindness. Though it
may seem counterintuitive, racial diversity promotes colorblindness by
rendering the racial identities of non-White students less salient. The ex-
periences of Jamaar M. Boyd, the only Black male student in Boalt's class
of 2003, demonstrate the link between the lack of racial diversity and racial
salience/consciousness. Boyd writes:
I entered Boalt Hall in the year 2000 as one of seven Black
students. However, I was the only Black male. Prior to entering law
school, I never defined myself by my gender in conjunction with
my race. As a practical matter, however, I could not deny the
reality of the situation: I was the only one. While there were other
people within my class who shared my race, there was not one
person who could assist me in providing my peers first hand insight
into the Black male's perspective. This problem was compounded
by the fact that I was the only Black student in all of my first-year
classes. Thus, I was forced into the dual obligation of representing
the perspective of the entire race within my classes while
attempting to represent my own unique identity within the first-
year class.
It is still an open question on how this impacted me. However, it is
clear that my classmates were cheated because they were denied a
diversity of views from Black people who occupied varying
socio-economic identities. By providing a range of views and
experiences, there is a higher probability that the "Black
perspective" is going to be expressed within the law school.
Without this, people may be forced to attempt to gather the insight
and experience of an entire race from one person. As the one Black
male out of two hundred and seventy students that entered Boalt
Hall in 2000, I think that this is inherently unfair to the student, the
student body, and the legal community as a whole. 8
Boyd's narrative is significant in at least three respects. First, it highlights
the burden of racial representation in academic contexts within which there
is little or no racial diversity. Boyd felt pressured to speak for, and to
18. Id. at 28-29.
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represent, Black people. Second, Boyd's remarks reveal how this burden of
representation is in tension with another-that he fit in. Boyd is in a racial
double bind here: he is expected to fit in (assimilate) as a person and rep-
resent (differentiate) his race. Third, Boyd's comments suggest that the
lack of racial diversity actually undermined his ability to be an individual.
"Prior to entering law school, I never defined myself by my gender in
conjunction with my race."19 The absence of diversity at Boalt Hall ren-
dered Boyd racially salient. He became the racial embodiment of Every
Black Man and thus was "forced" to define himself in racial terms. In sum,
Boyd's experiences provide at least anecdotal evidence that the lack of ra-
cial diversity promotes, rather than discourages, racial identification, racial
awareness, and racial consciousness. Far from undermining colorblindness,
racial diversity promotes it.
F. Speech
A sixth set of functions of diversity involves speech. Diversity per-
forms at least three important speech functions: (1) a content function;
(2) a viewpoint function; and (3) a speaker identification function.
1. The Content Function
Racial diversity shapes the content of discussions, especially in educa-
tional settings. Underlying this claim is the idea that there is a relationship
between identity and issue identification. Women, for example, may iden-
tify more with child care issues than men. Blacks, similarly, may identify
more with racial issues than Whites. If accepted, consider how this propo-
sition might play out in the context of a criminal procedure class, a course
one of us teaches. Imagine the class is discussing Florida v. Bostick,2" a
central case in criminal procedure. The facts of the case are as fol-
lows: While Bostick was sitting in the back of a bus, two law enforcement
officers, both part of a drug interdiction effort, approached him and asked
for identification, which Bostick provided.21 The officers then asked for
permission to search Bostick's luggage, and the search yielded incriminat-
ing evidence. In court, Bostick moved to suppress the evidence on the
grounds that he was unreasonably "seized" in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.22 The Court hinted that it did not think Bostick was seized but
remanded the case because the lower court had applied the wrong legal
standard.23
19. Id. at 28.
20. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
21. ld. at435.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Absent from the Court's analysis was an engagement of race and po-
licing. The Court did not even mention that Bostick is Black.24 Thus, one
could easily discuss this case without thinking about what many people
consider a reality of American life-race-based policing. This omission is
less likely if Black students are in the class. Black students are more likely
to wonder whether Bostick is Black and whether race played a role in the
officers' decision to engage him. To the extent that these issues are raised,
the content of the classroom discussion will change. Among other issues,
the class might discuss how, if at all, race should figure in the seizure
analysis.
Under a content-based conception of diversity, the point is not that
Black students would take a particular perspective on the role that race
should play in the seizure analysis. The point is that the issue is more likely
to be discussed with a Black presence in the classroom than without it.25 A
vast body of social science literature demonstrates that communicative in-
teractions among racially diverse groups are markedly different from com-
municative interactions between members of the same racial group.26 A
"flavor" is lost in communications that do not contain the voices of people
of color.2 7
2. The Viewpoint Function
The viewpoint function of diversity derives from a relationship be-
tween the identity of the speaker and what she is likely to say. People with
different racial identities have different experiences and thus view the
world differently. 28 Different experiences and ideas help promote and
24. For a racial critique of Florida v. Bostick, see Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth
Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002).
25. We draw from one of our personal experiences in teaching Bostick for this example.
26. See, e.g., Melanie Booth-Butterfield & Felicia Jordan, Communication Adaptation Among
Racially Homogenous and Heterogeneous Groups, 54 S. COMM. J. 253 (1989).
27. Cf Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1975) (stating that a community made up
exclusively of one sex is different from a community composed of both sexes and that a distinct flavor
is lost if either sex is excluded); see also Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Opening Remarks: Reclaiming
Yesterday's Future, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2000). Crenshaw comments:
Our extemporaneous performances together always excited me and taught me to cherish the
creative possibilities that working in a multiracial context provides. Yet, this delicate balance
now is lost, and the music we make in our classrooms today is often flat and monotonous.
When I step up to the podium today and pick up my baton, I see that my entire string section
is gone-just gone-forget about playing anything that sounds remotely the way it should;
the brass section is decimated, and the percussion can barely kick out a beat that can push us
along. Surely I try to compensate by playing some of the missing instruments myself; I'll
jump in the string section to play a few measures, run over to the homs to blow a note or two,
try to kick at the timpani on the way back to the podium, but there is no denying it-what we
are creating in our classrooms today is simply subpar.
Id.
28. For a discussion of the complicated relationship between identity, politics, and perspective,
see generally Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283 (2002) [hereinafter
Carbado, Race to the Bottom].
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sustain academic environments as robust marketplaces of ideas-
marketplaces shaped by disagreement and debate. In an educational setting,
disagreement and debate help remedy incorrect assumptions and generate
new ideas. People with diverse backgrounds help facilitate such debate and
shape the terms on which issues are discussed by drawing on their experi-
ences and contributing their unique viewpoints.2 9
For example, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recognized the relation-
ship between experience, perspective, and debate in her tribute to the late
Thurgood Marshall.3" There, she described the impact that Justice Marshall
had upon her life-and her decisions. She recalled how, early in her legal
career, Marshall's arguments in Brown v. Board of Education moved her:
[A]s I listened to Justice Marshall talk eloquently to the media
about the social stigmas and lost opportunities suffered by African
American children in state-imposed segregated schools, my
awareness of race-based disparities deepened. I did not, could not,
know it then, but the man who would, as a lawyer and jurist,
captivate the nation would also, as colleague and friend,
profoundly influence me.3
Justice O'Connor further recognized that Justice Marshall's influence on
her derived, at least in part, from the fact that they had "traveled [down]
different road[s],"32 that they had different identities, and thus different
experiences. While, as a woman, she had "experienced gender
discrimination enough,"33 she "had no personal sense ... of being a
minority in a society that cared primarily for the majority."34 Though she
did not always agree with Justice Marshall, after Marshall's departure from
the Court she still found herself "looking expectantly for his raised brow
and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just once more, another story that
would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world."35
Justice Thomas's recent participation in the oral arguments in Virginia
v. Black36 also reveals how racial diversity can engender viewpoint-based
speech.37 Justice Thomas, the only African American justice currently on
29. For an articulation of the evidence on the value of dissent and the harms of conformity,
particularly in the educational setting, see CASS SUNSTEIN, CONFORMITY AND DISSENT (Pub. Law and
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 34, 2002), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/
publiclaw/resources/34.crs.conformity.pdf.
30. Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1217 (1992).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1219.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1217.
35. Id. at 1220.
36. 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
37. See Joan Biskupic, Cross-Burning Case Agitates Thomas, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2002, at 3A;
Jan Crawford Greenburg, Emotional Court Weighs Cross Burning: Thomas Speaks Against 'Terror',
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2002, at 10; Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-
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the Court, interrupted the petitioner arguing in favor of Virginia's cross-
burning prohibition when the petitioner characterized cross-burning as a
symbol that produced an impending fear for minorities. Justice Thomas
contextualized the burning cross, linking it to its historical roots as a vio-
lent and terrorizing practice:
Justice Thomas: Mr. Dreeben, aren't you understating the-the
.effects of-of the burning cross? This statute was passed in what
year?
Mr. Dreeben: 1952 originally.
Justice Thomas: Now, it's my understanding that we had almost
100 years of lynchings and activity in the South by the Knights of
Camellia and-and the Ku Klux Klan, and this was a reign of
terror and the cross was a symbol of that reign of terror. Was-
isn't that significantly greater than intimidation or a threat?
Mr. Dreeben: Well, I think they're coextensive, Justice Thomas,
because it is-
Justice Thomas: Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that you're
actually understating the symbolism on--of and the effect of the
cross, the burning cross.3"
Presumably, Justice Thomas's identity as a Black person (and from a
particular region and era) shapes his viewpoint about cross burning. And
this viewpoint, articulated from a Justice known for his silence during oral
argument, changed the normative terms upon which the oral argument pro-
ceeded.39 After Justice Thomas's interruption, the constitutionality of cross
burning could no longer be framed in terms of disgust or discomfort; the
Court and the participants were forced to engage in a conversation about
racial terror and violence. While we cannot know for sure what the nature
of the conversation and questioning would have been without the presence
of a Clarence Thomas, the transcript suggests that Justice Thomas's ques-
tions changed the substance and tone of the oral argument.4"
Burning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at AI; Shannon McCaffrey, Burning Crosses Symbolize Terror,
Thomas Says; His Rare Comments Come as Supreme Court Weighs Whether Act Is Free Speech, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 12, 2002, at A2; Patty Reinert, Justices Debate Cross Burning: Virginia's
Ban Violates Free Speech Rights, Challengers Argue, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 12, 2002, at A5; David G.
Savage, Thomas Assails Cross-Burning as Terror Tactic, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at A14.
38. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, No. 01-1107, 2002 WL 31838589, at *22-
23 (Dec. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Transcript].
39. See Savage, supra note 37.
40. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 38, at *25 (reporting the question of another Justice as
beginning: "But it seems to me from this argument, if the message is as powerful as Justice Thomas
suggests it is-and I'm sure he's-he's right about that...").
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3. The Speaker Identification Function
In the context of discussions about important social policy questions,
people pay attention not only to what is being said (viewpoint and content)
but also to who is saying what. In other words, the identity of the speaker
shapes how we respond to her arguments. Identity performs a signaling
function for speech, and there are a number of different ways in which it
can do so.4' The following hypothetical will help demonstrate this.
Imagine a criminal procedure class discussing Whren v. United
States,42 in which the Supreme Court held that racial profiling claims are
not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. A White student and a Latina
student debate this decision in class. The White student supports the
Court's opinion, and the Latina student does not. The class response to
their arguments is likely to be shaped, at least in part, by how each stu-
dent's identity cues her speech. Consider, for example, trustworthiness.
The class could decide that they do not trust the White student's assess-
ment of the harms of racial profiling because she has not been racially pro-
filed. She is too removed, presuming to speak about a social problem she
has not herself encountered. Alternatively, the class could decide that the
Latina student is too situated, too emotional, too close to the experience, to
perform a cost/benefit analysis objectively. However the class responds, it
likely will take into account the cuing effect of each student's identity.43
This cuing effect will inform how the class thinks about each student's
ideas, not only with respect to trustworthiness, but also with respect to such
important criteria for evaluating speech as persuasiveness, legitimacy,
credibility, and authority.
G. Institutional Culture
A seventh function of diversity is that it engenders student initiative
and involvement. Diversity can engender conduct with the potential to
transform universities. Concretely, as a result of diversity, students have
broadened the intellectual activity of universities and shaped their institu-
tional cultures. For example, the presence of students of color and other
41. See Shelly Chalken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of
Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 752, 752 (1980)
(suggesting that people rely on "non-content cues" including, but not limited to, "identity" in evaluating
the message of the speaker). For a canvassing of this literature that suggests that in processing speech,
listeners pay attention to both content- and noncontent-based cues, see Gia B. Lee, Persuasion,
Transparency, and Government Speech (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
42. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
43. One could complicate identity issues further by adding details about each speaker's dress,
mannerisms, hair, or other performative aspects of identity. For an argument about how race is
understood not only in terms of phenotypic evidence (for example, whether a person is Asian
American) but by performative evidence as well (for example, whether the person appears to be
assimilationist or nonassimilationist), see generally Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, Working
Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000).
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disadvantaged groups has affected both undergraduate and law school cur-
ricula. Not until large numbers of minorities were admitted to colleges and
universities in the late 1960s did those institutions begin to develop Black
Studies programs and departments devoted to ethnic studies. Chicana/o
studies programs were also developed largely in response to student de-
mands in West Coast public universities." In 1969, students of color at
U.C. Berkeley led the Third World Strike, which Sumi Cho and Robert
Westley describe as one of "the most institutionally significant student
strike[s] in U.C. Berkeley's history." This strike triggered the creation of
the Ethnic Studies departments and affirmative action admissions and re-
cruitment at U.C. Berkeley, a historically White educational institution.46
Student-body diversity has likewise shaped legal education and schol-
arship. The development of Critical Race Theory, for example, is directly
linked to the presence and activism of students of color at Harvard Law
School and Boalt Hall, among other institutions.47 As a result of this con-
tinuing presence and activism, almost every law school offers at least one
course focusing directly on race and the law, and several have a course
specifically titled Critical Race Theory. Quite recently, Asian American
students at Columbia Law School persuaded the administration to add an
Asian American Jurisprudence course to the curriculum. At UCLA, the law
school faculty approved a Critical Race Studies Curriculum, which offers
students the opportunity to engage in a systematic and rigorous examina-
tion of the ways in which law, historically, has both created and restricted
the social, economic, and political opportunities of people of color. None
of the foregoing developments would have occurred without students of
color.
For the most part, the foregoing conceptions of diversity are absent
from the affirmative action literature. This is a problem because, as
Guerrero points out, diversity is the most palatable justification for affirma-
tive action. To put the point another way, supporting diversity in education
is less controversial than challenging institutional racism in education. In
this respect, it bears mentioning that the diversity rationale for affirmative
action leaves in place traditional admissions criteria, like LSAT scores,
44. See Jean Stefanic, Latino and Latina Critical Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 85 CALIF.
L. REV. 1509, 1510 (1997).
45. See Cho & Westley, supra note 16, at 1382.
46. Id. at 1382.
47. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT XiV, Xix
(Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); MARI J. MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY? AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON RACE, GENDER, AND THE LAW 50 (1996); Cho & Westley, supra note 16, at 1378-79, 1404;
see also Peter M. Cicchino, An Activist at Harvard Law School, 50 Am. U. L. REV. 551, 555 (2001)
(discussing how gay and lesbian student protest helped establish courses that focus on issues germane
to the gay and lesbian community).
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which embed race and class preferences. 48 And, indeed, few of the briefs in
the Michigan cases before the Court contest the legitimacy of standardized
tests, even though the racial effects of these tests are stark.49
But neither do these briefs set out precisely how racial diversity func-
tions. That was the goal of this Review Essay: to begin a conversation
about the contours of racial diversity and to move the academic and juris-
prudential discourse about diversity away from the question of whether, for
example, Blacks speak in a "different voice"5 to the question of whether
the absence of Black people speaking on college and university campuses
undermines American democracy.
CONCLUSION
The functions of racial diversity we describe in this Review Essay can
be employed as a set of criteria for determining what kinds of diversity
universities should pursue. Consider what these criteria suggest vis-A-vis
the claim that there is an inadequate representation of White, fundamental-
ist Christians in law school student populations. On its face this is a racial
diversity argument. But does this racial diversity argument have the same
force as ours? Recall that diversity helps to undermine negative social
meanings about race. What would be the social meaning value of increas-
ing the representation of White, fundamentalist Christians in the law
school's student body? Asked a little differently, is there a danger that the
underrepresentation of White, fundamentalist Christians will entrench, le-
gitimize, or reproduce a set of preexisting negative stereotypes of White,
fundamentalist Christians? Consider now the function of inclusion. Is there
an underrepresentation of White, fundamentalist Christians in the democ-
ratic process such that there is a particular need to provide them with ac-
cess to educational capital or place them in positions of economic
privilege? If the answer to these questions is in the negative, then one can
query whether the inclusion of White, fundamentalist Christians is as com-
pelling as the inclusion of Latinas/os from South Central Los Angeles.
Significantly, our claim is not that the functions of diversity we de-
scribe should operate as a set of criteria in a once-and-for-all sense. Race is
a social construction, shifting in meaning over time and from context to
context. In some contexts, the inclusion of a White, fundamentalist
48. See generally Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of
Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Affirmative Action Debate, II HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (1994).
49. But see Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of a Committee of Concerned Black Law Graduates
in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted,
123 S. Ct. 617 (Dec. 2, 2002) (No. 02-241), available at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/
gru-amicus-ussc/um/BLSG-gru.pdf (last visited May 3, 2003).
50. See Carbado, Race to the Bottom, supra note 28, at 1297-1305 (complicating the relationship
between identity and voice).
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Christian will add more diversity than the inclusion of a Latinalo from Los
Angeles. Our claim instead, then, is that once we have a set of criteria, we
can move to debating whether the criteria are appropriate and whether the
particular kind of diversity being pursued adequately satisfies those crite-
ria. We hope that the taxonomy of diversity functions we provide moves
the literature and the political conversations surrounding diversity in this
direction.
